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THE CONNECTICUT STATUTE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES.
The statute against perpetuities was repealed by the Gen-
eral Assembly of Connecticut in 1895, after having been in
force for more than a century, and the history of its construc-
tion and application by the courts is interesting as an experi-
ment in the development of new rules of law in this country.
The statute was intended to prevent the creation of interests
which cannot take effect until a remote time, and it accom-
plished that object by prohibiting gifts to a certain class of
persons, namely, such as will not be born until before such
time. The common law developed a rule which attained the
same object by prohibiting gifts which are not to vest within a
certain time. The rule has been stated thus: "No interest
subject to a condition precedent is good, unless the condition
must be fulfilled, if at all, within twenty-one years after some
life in being at the creation of the interest."*
The statute was enacted in 1784, being section 2 of "An
Act relating to the Age, Ability, and Capacity of Persons," in
the following words: "And in order tojprevent Peretuiies it is hereby
provided, That no Estate, either in Fee-Simple, Free-Tail or
any lesser Estate shall be given by Deed or Will to any Person
or Persons, but such as are in being, or to the immediate Issue
or Descendants of such as are in Being, at the Time of making
such Deed or Will. And that all Estates given in Tail shall be
and remain an absolute Estate in Fee-Simple, to the Issue of
the first Donee in Tail."t It will be noted that the first part of
this section forbids gifts to a certain class of persons, and it
alone is concerned with perpetuities in the proper sense of the
term. This first part of the section will for convenience be
*Gray on Perpetuities, 9 201. Therefore the rule might be called with
more propriety the rule against remoteness. It has been said that the sus-
pension of the power of alienation beyond the limits fixed by law is the test
of a perpetuity; but the intermediate tenants may alienate whatever interest
they have whether the remainder is a perpetuity or not. Whether the law
will permit a donee to take a gift at all. is one question; whether, having
taken it, he shall be bound by a condition not to part with it, is another question.
In Tarrant v. Backus, 63 Conn. 277, there was a gift to testator's sons and an
attempt to make the same inalienable. The court held the gift good, whether
the attempted restraint on alienation was valid or not.
f Rev. St., 1784, p. 3 [, 2].
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called in this article "the statute against perpetuities." The
second part declares the nature and effect of gifts in tail, and
will be referred to as "the statute of entails."
The whole section appeared substantially without change
in every revision of the statutes from its original enactment in
1784 to the last revision in 1883.* The only changes not merely
grammatical or rhetorical are the following: In the revision of
1821 the section was transferred to the title "Lands," and
thereafter remained under that title. In 1885 the statute of
wills was amended by incorporating into it the prohibition of
the statute against perpetuities with an exception of gifts for
public and charitable uses, including the care of graves,t and
the statute of wills, so amended, appeared in the revision of
z888 under the title Wills.1 The statute of charitable uses was
in the same year amended so as to include gifts for the care of
graves,§ which had theretofore been illegal.0 In x884 the
wording of the statute was changed from "persons in being,"
etc., "at the time of making such deed or will," to "persons in
being," etc., "at the time of the delivery of such deed or the
death of the testator;" but this amendment was held in the
case of Johnson v. Edmond** to be merely declaratory and not
to change the substance of the law. In x895 the statute against
perpetuities was repealed,tt leaving the statute of entailsj in
* 1784, p. 3, f 2.
1795, p. 24. § 2.
i8o8. pp. 42, 43. Title viii, § 2.
1821, Pp. 299. oi. Title 56, c. i., § 4.
1835. p. 348, Title 58, C. i., § 4.
1839, p. 389, Title 57. c. i., § 4.
1849, pp. 454. 455. Title xxix, c. i., § 4.
1854. pp. 629. 63o, Title xxix, C. i., § 4.
x866. pp. 536 537, Title xxxvii, c. i., § 4.
1875, p. 352, Title xviii, c. 6, pt.1 § 3.
1888, § 2952; also § 537.
fAct 1885, c. O, 130, p. 50o.
Gen. St. i888, § 537.
§Act 1885, c. 36, p. 427; Gen. St. i888, § 2951.
Coit v. Comstock. 51 Conn. 352, 386 (1883). In Bolles v. Smith, 39 Conn.
217 (1872). such a gift had been allowed to stand without contest, the court
expressly refraining from passing on its validity. In Bent's'Appeal, 38 Conn.
26 (1871), the point had been raised but not decided. Such gifts have been
valid since the act of 1885. Bronson v. Strouse, 57 Conn. 147 (1888).
Act 1884. c. 87, p.'367; Gen. St. 1888, §§ 2952, 537.
** 65 Conn. 492. 500 (1895).
trAct June 29, 1895. C. 249, p. 590.
44 Gen. St. 1888, § 2952.
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force, and the statute of wills* unchanged except by the
erasure therefrom of the prohibition of gifts to persons barred
by the statute of perpetuities.
Thus the enactment of 1784 remained in full force for more
than a century, during which period all reported casest upon
the subject of perpetuities in this state arose, and the statute
has been adjudged to be declaratory of the common law of the
state and colony as it had been from the beginning, but this,
it is believed, has always been in cases when the Court was con-
struing that part of the section which is herein called the
statute of entails.t There are dicta, extending this statement
to the statute against perpetuities,§ but it is believed that no
adjudged case rests upon such an extension. The following
explanation of the origin of the statute is suggested. There
was an ancient rule of the English common law which, after a
life estate in real property to an unborn person, forbade a
remainder to a child of such person, because it would be a
"possibility upon a possibility." The existence of such a rule
has been denied,I but it is established not only that such a rule
existed before the modern rule against perpetuities arose, but
that it still exists, and that a limitation contrary to it is void,
though not in conflict with the more modern rule.4f This
ancient rule of real property law was brought to Connecticut
by the English colonists, and there grew up beside it, by the
common consent of the colonists, the rule that entailed estates
became absolute fees in the issue of the first donee in tail, and
the two rules were embodied in the statute of x784. This
explanation is rendered probable by the fact that the compilers
of the revision of 1821, in arranging the statutes in the order
of their subject matter, instead of the alphabetical order of
their titles, which seems to have been issued theretofore, placed
the entire section under the title "Lands." In time the origin
*Id. § 537.
f Except Healy v. Healy, 70 Conn. 467 (1898), recently published.
t Hamilton v. Hempstead, 3 Day 3 2 (I809); Chappel v. Brewster, Kirby
175 (1786).
§ See the dissenting opinion of Daggett, J., in Allyn v. Mather, 9 Conn.
130 (1832); cited in Johnson v. Edmond, 65 Conn. 499. The argument of Judge
Daggett would be equally valid if the common law rule and not the statutory
rule had been in force before the enactment of the statute.
Gray on Perpetuities, § 133, n. (1886), approving Lewis on Perpetuities.
Whitby v. Mitchell, L. R., 42 Ch. Div. 494 (i889) affirmed by Court of
Appeal, 44 id. 85 (i8go), in re Frost, 43 id. 246 (1889).
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of the statute against perpetuities was forgotten, and it was
applied to personal property, apparently without controversy.*
The courts have construed the words "immediate issue or
descendants" to mean children only, excluding grandchildren
and more remote lineal descendants, as well as all collateral
kinsmen. Thus a gift to the unborn son of a person in being is
valid;t but the following have been held to be void: A gift to
the children or other descendants of persons in being, to take
effect upon A's reaching the age of eighteen years, for the
"other descendants" are barred by the statutes;t a contingent
gift upon the death of testator's last surviving daughter, to the
issue of testator's grandchildren then deceased, including
grandchildren born after the testator's death;§ a gift upon the
arrival at the age of twenty-one years of the youngest child of
testator's daughter, to the children of any deceased child of said
daughter, per sdtrpes;H or, upon the death of testator's last sur-
viving child, to testator's grandchildren and their heirs;T or to
those who shall, after the expiration of certain lives in being,
be the "heirs " or "descendants" of a person in being at the time
of the gift.** It is believed that all these gifts would have been
valid under the common law rule.tt In view of these decisions
the meaning of the statute is: No gift is valid unless made to a per-
son in being, or to the child of such ajrson.
Under the statute, if it be construed most liberally in aid of
a gift, all gifts must vest within two generations at the most,
and under the rule, within a life or lives in being and twenty-
one years and a few months thereafter. Nevertheless the stat-
ute and the rule accomplish their common end by means radi-
cally different. The statute prohibits gifts to a class of persons
not related in a certain way to some person in being at the time
of the gift; while the rule prohibits gifts designed to take effect
beyond the limits of a certain future time, measured by any life
in being at the time of the gift.
* Rand v. Butler, 48 Conn. 293 (i88o); Alfred v. Marks, 49 Conn. 473 (1882).
tAllyn v. Mather, 9 Conn. 114, 127 (1832).
Wheeler v. Fellowes, 52 Conn. 238.
Andrews v. Rice. 53 Conn. 567. 569 (1885).
Landers v. Dell, 61 Conn. x89 (1891); see also Hewitt v. N. Y. R. Co., etc.
70 Conn. 637.
Morris v. Bolles, 65 Conn. 45 (1894).
** Rand v. Butler, 48 Conn. 293, 299 (i88o); Alfred v. Marks, 49 Conn. 473,
476 (,882); Anthony v. Anthony, 55 Conn. 256 (1887); Leake v. Watson, 6o
Conn. 498 (i89i); Beers v. Narramore, 61 Conn. 13 (189I); Ketchum v. Corse, 65
Conn. 85 (1894); Johnson v. Webber, 65.Conn. 5o (1894); Security Co. v. Snow,
70 Conn. 288 (1898).
tHealy v. Healy. 70 Conn. 467 (1898).
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Did the statute abrogate the common law rule as to all gifts,
or were some, such as gifts to charitable uses, to be governed
by the rule and others by the statute, or were both in force at
the same time with respect to all gifts, the rule fixing the time
within which gifts must vest and the statute restricting the
class of persons in whom gifts might vest within such time; or
were both thus in force with respect to some gifts, and only one
with respect to others? The decisions do not answer these ques-
tions clearly.
The universal application of the statute is suggested by the
case of Jocelyn v. Nott.* In that case a gift to any Congrega-
tional church which should fulfill certain conditions, with no
limit as to time, was held void for uncertainty as to the time of
its vesting, and the court said that under the statute all estates
must vest within the lifetime of some person in being, or within
the lifetime of the issue of some person in being at their crea-
tion, and that charitable gifts were no exception to the statute.
But in Pendleton v. Kinneyt it was said that gifts to charity
were not within the statute. There was in this case a gift for
certain lives, with forfeiture to a charity upon breach of condi-
tion, and the gift to charity was held good because the inter-
mediate estate could not exceed the specified lives in being at
testator's death. Moreover the rule against perpetuities is re-
ferred to asif in forceby Judge Swift;j and in the case of St. John,
Adm., v. Dann,§ where there was a gift to G. and his family until
G. shall discharge his present liabilities, then to G. absolutely,
such gift was held valid under the rule, because the trust was
not to exceed the life of G., and under the statute, because
"family" was construed as excluding persons barred by the
statute. So in Belfield v. Booth,f the division in fee was to be
postponed until fourteen years after the executor should have
settled the estate, and it was contended that this might post-
pone the vesting until more than twenty-one years after the
testator's death, which would render the gift in fee void under
the common law rule. The court admitted that the rule was
in force, and said that a postponement for more than twenty-
one years would avoid the gift, but held that a reasonable time
for settlement was implied, which must be less than seven years
*44 Conn. 55 (x876). The Court also says that the gift is void under
the common law rule.
t 65 Conn. 222 (1894).
4Morgan v. Morgan, 5 Day 517, 526 (1813).
66 Conn. 4oi (1895).
63 Conn., 299 (1893).
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after the testator's death, and such postponement could not,
therefore, be for so long a time as twenty-one years. The gift
was accordingly upheld. In Bent's Appeal from Probate* there
were gifts to the surviving children of testator's sons, including
those thereafter born, when the youngest of such children
arrived at the age of thirty years. This might be more than
twenty-one years after the testator's death, and the appellant
claimed, among other things, that the gift was void under the
common law rule. The appellees contended that the rule was
not in force in Connecticut and that the gift was valid, since
it was not within the prohibition of the statute. The court
avoided a decision on this point. It should be remembered
that the common law rule was far from settled when the
Colonies were planted, though in the absence of statute it
has been adopted throughout the United States in its mod-
ern English form.t The conclusion that the rule and statute
were concurrently in force in Connecticut is supported by
Belfield v. Booth (supra), although the statute has been cited
as furnishing a measure of time within which gifts must
vest, different from that furnished by the rule, and if this
were true it would be hard to see how they could both be oper-
ative.
Thus in Tappan's Appeal,4 a gift for charitable uses upon a
condition subsequent to be performed within three years after
testratix's decease, with a provision that the judge of probate
for good reason might by his written order extend the time,
was held valid because such extension must be reasonable. It
was said that to render a gift invalid its terms must suspend
"the absolute power of alienation" during such a period to
allow the issue of a person unborn at the time of the gift to
take; a period manifestly much longer than three years. This
was in answer to the argument of counsel based on New York
decisions under a statute of that state prohibiting the suspen-
sion of the power of alienation beyond a certain period. In
New Haven Young Men's Institute v. City of New Haven,§ a
gift for a charitable use to a beneficiary to be selected by the
defendant at its discretion, was attacked on the ground that
such selection might not be made until a time more remote than
that permitted by the statute, but the court" held that the
*38 Conn. 26 (x871.)
f Gray, Perpetuities, §, 200.
t 52 Conn. 412, 420 (1884). See also Woodruff v. Marsh, 63 Conn. 125.
(1893).
§6o Conn. 32 (1890).
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defendant must proceed forthwith to select the beneficiary. It
is believed that the same conclusions would result from the
application of the common law rule.
Since the repeal of the statute the common law rule has
been in force, so that a remainder upon A.'s death to his law-
ful heirs is valid if created since the repealing act of x895.*
The common law doctrine that a vested gift to a class may
be so made that the share of any member is defeasable by
death before the period of enjoyment and that new members
may be born into the class who will ultimately take the whole
gift, has been adopted in Connecticut. The reason for this is
that a vested gift never contravenes the rule, since it is not
subject to a condition precedent. In Farnam v. Farnamt a trust
had been created for certain lives and the testator pro-
vided that upon the death of the survivor, "I give * * *
all the estate * * * then held in trust * * * to my
grandchildren who shall then be living," the children of
any deceased grandchild to take their parent's share. This
gift was attacked on the ground that the children of a de-
ceased grandchild might be the issue of a grandchild born
after the testator's death and barred by the statute, but
the court separated the donees into two classes, the first con-
sisting of the grandchildren, who could not be barred by the
statute, and who took as a class opening to let in the after
born, the share of each member being defeasable by death
without issue before the time fixed, while the second consisted
of the great-grandchildren. The gifts to these were valid or
not as their parents were in being or not at testator's death.
The gift to the grandchildren was valid. This case was fol-
lowed in Belfield v. Bootht and Johnson v. Webber.§
If by the terms of the gift it is uncertain whether the donee
will or will not turn out to be a person barred by the statute,
then the whole gift is void. The mere possibility of such an
event bars the donee, and the courts will not await the event
and allow the donee to take, if he should turn out to be a per-
son not barred.0 In Alfred v. Marks there was a gift to L., a
child seven years of age, for life, and upon his death without
* Healy v. Healy, 70 Conn. 467 (1898.)
t 53 Conn. 261 (188s).
t 63 Conn. 299 (1893).
§65 Conn. 5o (1894).
I Rand v. Butler 48 Conn. 293; Wheeler v. Fellowes 52 Conn. 238; Tap-
pan's Appeal, id. 412, 420.
49 Conn. 473 (I882).
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children remainder, to the heirs of W. At the time of the suit
W. was living and L. had died without children, but the remain-
der to the heirs of W. was held void because, at the time of
the gift it was uncertain whether or not the heirs of W. at
L's death might be grandchildren whose parents were not in
being when the gift was made. So under the common law rule
if the contingency might possibly happen beyond the time
fixed, the gift was void.*
But the question of the validity of a gift which is disputed
on this ground will not be determined unless necessarily involved
in the controversy. Thus, in Farnam v. Farnam,t a suit for the
construction of a will, the validity of the gift to children of a de-
ceased grandchild was questioned, and it was said that the issue
of each grandchild was a separate class and the gift to it might
or might not be valid, but the court further said that the ques-
tion was unimportant and refrained from deciding it. So in
Johnson v. Edmond,J which was also an action for the construc-
tion of a will, there *as a gift to A. for life, and at. her death to
her children and the descendant of any child who may have
deceased, and a gift over to B. A. died childless after the tes-
tator's death. The court held it unnecessary to consider the
effect of the attempted gift to the descendants of A.'s deceased
children, and that the property vested in B. at testator's death
subject to A.'s life interest and subject also to the contingency
A.'s dying without surviving descendants. In the similar case
of Johnson v. Webber,§ after a valid vested gift to testatrix's
grand children, as a class, there was an attempted gift over of
the share of any member of the class upon his death before the
period of enjoyment. This event never happened, and the
.court refused to consider the validity of the gift over, because,
if invalid, it would not affect the gift to the class, and if valid
it was inoperative because the contingency never occurred.
When the gift is to a class, some members of which may
be persons barred by the statute, it is void as to all membersl
The validity of gifts to charitable uses has been determined in
accordance with the decisions under the common law rule.
Thus a gift in trust to be applied partly to uses non-charitable
and the rest to charitable uses is wholly void, for a little char-
*Gray, Perpetuities, § 214.
t 53 Conn. 261.
t6s Conn. 492 (1894).
§65 Conn. 5o (x894).
1 See headnote in Hewitt v. N. Y. etc. R. Co., 7P Conn. 637 (1898).
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ity will not save a gift;* and after a gift in trust for one chari-
table use, a gift over by way of forfeiture for breach of condition
at any time in the future to other trustees for another charita-
ble use, is valid.t A remote gift to a charity is valid if there is
no intermediate gift to a non-charitable useJ and income may
be accumulated and added to principal for such period and in
such amounts as are reasonable in view of the objects of the
charity and other circumstances. Thus, where there was a gift
of $400,000, to establish and maintain a school, with a provision
that $zio,ooo be accumulated each year and added to the princi-
pal for one hundred years and longer, if the trustees should
deem it best, such accumulation was held reasonable in view of
the amount of the principal and the probable increase of popu-
ulation in the state, and it was said that an unreasonable accu-
mulation after one hundred years had elapsed could be stopped
by the courts.§ Accumulation for private uses during lives in
being is allowed.I1
The question often arises whether a gift, partly void and
partly valid, can be separated so that the valid part may stand.
This can be done only when it .would not involve consequences
substantially and materially different from what the donor in-
tended. Thus a gift to testator's daughters and their children
during the lives of said daughters and the survivor of them is
good, though coupled with a void contingent gift over upon the
death of such survivor. J And where certain property was
divided into two funds, and there was a valid gift of the first
and a valid gift of certain annual payments out of the income
of the second for the lives of certain persons and the survivor
of them, followed by a void gift over upon the death of such
survivor to testatrix's then lineal descendants, it was held that
* Coit v. Comstock, 51 Conn. 352 (1883.)
f Storrs Agricultural School v. Whitney, 54 Conn. 342 (1887). The case of
Jocelyn v. Nott, 44 Conn. 55 (1876), was distinguished. In the latter case a
charitable gift upon the fulfillment of certain conditions in the future, without
certainty as to time or as to the beneficiary was held void, and the court said
that there was no exception to the statute in favor of charitable gifts. See
also Gray, Perpetuities, § 597.
t Woodruff v. Marsh, 63 Conn. 125 (893). The authorities on this point
under the common law rule are conflicting. The court approved Russell v.
Allen, 107 U. S. 163.
§ Ibid. For the common law rule see Gray, Perpetuities, ch. 20.
Andrews v. Rice, 53 Conn. 567; Farnam v. Farnam, id. 261; Morris
v. Bolles, 65 Conn. 45; Johnson v. Webber, id. 501.
Andrews v. Rice, 53 Conn. 567. See also: Leake v. Watson, 6o Conn.
498; Landers v. Dell, 61 Conn. 189; Morris v. Bolles, 65 Conn. 45.
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neither the valid gift of the first fund nor the valid gift of in-
come from the second, was affected by the void gift in re-
mainder.* On the other hand if a will creates a trust during
the lives of testator's widow and children and the survivor of
them, makes a valid gift of income to the widow for life, gives
a valid remainder (of income) to the children, and on the
decease of any child a void gift (of income) to the lineal
descendants of suc:h, child, and finally a void gift in fee on the
termination o the trust to the lineal descendants of the
testator's children, the valid gift of income to the widow is not
affected by the invalid gifts, but the valid gift of income to
testator's children during the lives of the widow and children
and the survivor of them cannot be separated from the invalid
gifts and must fail, and the trust must terminate at the widow's
death.t
Where the terms of a gift are doubtful the law will not look
to the statute to discover the donor's intention, but his words
will be construed independently, and after their meaning is
determined the statutory test will be applied. The question of
validity often depends upon the time when the donees are to be
determined; thus a gift to B. and at B.'s death to testator's
heirs was held to be a vested remainder in testator's heirs at
his death, and therefore valid;t but if the gift had been con-
strued to be to persons answering the description of testator's
"heirs" at B.'s death it would have been void, for such
persons might be the issue of persons unborn at the time
of the gift. So where there was a gift in trust until tes-
tator's youngest grandchild became eighteen years of age,
followed by a gift in fee, it was held that the youngest grand-
child in being at testator's death was meant.§ A
provision that if the testatrix's granddaughter shall die leav-
ing "a husband," then I give to "said husband," means the
husband of the granddaughter at the time of the gift, and not
any future husband. But where a trust was created for the
support of A. "until he is of lawful age, then to be his or his
children's forever," and in case he should die without -children,
a gift to the heirs of W., it was held that such heirs could not be
known until A. died without children, and therefore the gift to
them is a void executory devise. Gifts in remainder are fre-
* Johnson v. Webber, 65 Conn. 581.
t Ketchum v. Corse. 65 Conn. 85.
$ Rand v. Butler, 48 Conn. 293, 299 (188o).
§ Wheeler v. Fellowes, 52 Conn. 238 (1884).
I Johnson v. Webber, 65 Conn. 5ox.
Alfred v. Marks, 49 Conn. 473, Carpenter, J., dissenting.
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quently made by will to the "heirs," "issue" or "legal repre-
sentatives" of certain persons, and their validity depends upon
the construction given to such descriptive words. The intent
of the testator will of course control. A provision for such of
testatrix's heirs at law as may be in need of pecuniary assist-
ance,applies only to persons living at the time of testatrix's death,
and the gift is valid.* "Legal representatives" often means
executors and administrators, and a gift to a person not barred
by the statute, or his legal representatives if he dies before
the time of enjoyment, is construed as a vested gift in fee
to him;t but "heirs and legal representatives" may mean
lineal descendants, as for instance where there is a trust
during the lives of testator's children and the survivor of
them, income to be paid to them, and upon the death of
any, to his "heirs and legal representatives" and upon
the termination of the trust the principal to be paid
to the "heirs and legal representatives" of the children.t
So "heirs" must frequently be taken literally or as equivalent
to "statutory distributees," though this avoids the gift. For ex-
ample, a gift to A. for life and remainder to his "heirs" or "legal
heirs,"§ or upon the expiration of certain lives to the "heirs'"
of testator's children or grandchildren.11 But the word may
mean children, as in the case of a trust, the income to be paid
to testator's sons during their lives, and on the death of either
son a gift to his widow if he leaves no "heirs," but if he does
leave "heirs," division to be made to the family the same as
before his death until the youngest child arrives at the age of
twenty-one years, when there shall be a division in fee to the
"heirs." It is frequently important to determine whether the
gift is made to a class or to individuals, for if the former, it is
good, and if the latter, bad. The following have been construed
to be gifts to a class. In trust during the lives of testator's
widow and children and the survivor of them, and upon the
death qf such survivor "this trust shall cease and I give all the
estate which shall then be held in trust to my grandchildren
who shall then be living per capita and not per stirpes;"** or upon
the death of testator's two granddaughters certain property to
*Bronson v. Strouse, 57 Conn. x47.
t Tarrant v. Backus, 63 Conn. 277, 290; Johnson v. Edmond, 65 Conn. 492.
$ Ketchum v. Corse, 65 Conn. 85.
§ Anthony v. Anthony, 55 Conn. 256; Leake v. Watson, 6o Conn. 498.
I Beers v. Narramore, 61 Conn. 13; Morris v. Bolles, 65 Conn. 45.
Anthony v. Anthony, 55 Conn. 256.
*- Farnam v. Farnam. 53 Conn. 261.
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be divided and distributed equally among their children per
capia.* But the gift is individual where it is provided that
upon the death of testator's daughter the trustees shall divide
the principal "into as many equal shares as I may have grand-
children or their issue then living, the issue of any deceased
grandchild to be counted as one share," one share to be
given to each grandchild and one to the issue of each deceased
grandchild;f or where, upon the termination of a prior trust,
there is a gift in fee to the children of testator's daughter, the
children of any such child who may have deceased to take its
parent's share.t
It is worthy of note that though the statute against perpe-
tuities is itself ancient, all decisions under it are quite recent.
We find it referred to by the court in 1832,§ urged by counsel in
1871,11 and stated by the court as a ground for the decision in Joce-
lyn v. Nott in 1876, though it would seem that the true ground
for that decision is the common law rule. In Rand v. Butler**
(r88o) the "heirs" of the testator are cofistrued to mean those
who are heirs at the testator's death, and the court holds that
if it were otherwise construed the gift would be void under the
statute. In the year i882,tt ninety-eight years after the enact-
ment of the statute, we have the first unequivocal ruling that
a gift is void under it. Since that time the cases have been
numerous. It would seem that the statute remained forgot-
ten or undiscovered for a long period, that gifts were frequently
made in conflict, or seemingly in conflict with its provisions,
and that when attention was called to it by frequent decisions
its repeal was demanded by the public. The influence of the
decisions of the courts of England and other states has been
so strong that an attempt to differentiate our law from that
prevailing in those jurisdictions has failed.
The Ohio statute of December x7, i81, is copied from that
of Connecticut verbatim except that its operation is restricted
to "lands or tenements lying within the state." The courts
have construed "immediate issue or descendants" as including
grandchildren whose parents were dead; and it has been held
that the prohibition of the statute has regard only to persons,
so that if a gift, otherwise good, be made to a class of persons
some of whom are barred by the statute and some not, it is
valid as to the latter and void as to the former.1
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